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ABSTRACT : On the eve of the foundation of the University of Berlin, Wilhelm von Humboldt 
was in charge of choosing between the various proposals submitted for the organization of the 
future institution.  Since he had to choose for instance between the Fichte’s and Schleiermacher’s 
proposals, he retained the project of the latter, feeling closer to Schleiermacher’s liberal approach 
than with Fichte’s more ‘authoritarian’ views.  In fact, the profound difference between 
Humboldt and Fichte is to be found in their respective conception of the ‘vocation of man’.  For 
Humboldt the human being has to develop his/her own unique personality through the process of 
“Bildung”, whereas for Fichte the ultimate aim of human beings is to reach a point of perfection 
in which all individuals would be identical. This fundamental divergence has consequences on all 
aspects of the project: curriculum, student life and pedagogy.   
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*  *  * 
 It is in the fall of 1810 that the first classes were given in the brand new 
University of Berlin. In itself, the occurrence is historically important because this 
institution was to be called upon to become the “prototype of modern university.”1 But 
the historical event of the foundation of the University of Berlin also presents a 
philosophical interest, insofar as, when the time came to outline the structures of this 
establishment of higher education, it is philosophers who were invited to submit their 
projects, in accordance with their idea of the status and role of knowledge. The drafts of 
                                                
1 See Louis Dumont, L’idéologie allemande (Paris: Gallimard, 1991). 
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these projects are for that matter available in an anthology devoted to the idea of the 
German university.2 We find therein, besides the texts of Fichte and Schleiermacher, the 
one from Wilhelm von Humboldt whom, by virtue of his administrative responsibilities, 
had to make a choice between the proposals of the first two. We know that he will adopt 
Schleiermacher’s project, and not Fichte’s. The latter actually defends an “authoritarian” 
approach to teaching which is diametrically opposed to Schleiermacher’s own, described 
as “liberal”. 
 I borrow the contrast ‘authoritarian/liberal’ from the “Présentation” of the French 
translation of the anthology referred to, which thereby sets the limits of the debate 
between Fichte and Schleiermacher.3 It is understood, of course, that we will have to go 
back on the validity of this characterization. For the moment, we must admit that this 
dichotomy is very useful at first sight. In fact, if we set out to intrepret those qualifying 
terms litteraly, we must expect to see Schleiermacher attach the greatest importance to 
individual freedom within the confines of university life, while Fichte in all probability 
will tend to favor autority, even to abuse it. This reading follows the first semantic 
content of these terms. Now, it is advisable to note that this contrast is expressed in a 
vocabulary that belongs to the sphere of politics. Yet the underlying significance of what 
is really at stake here is to be found somewhere else.  
As I have said, it is philosophers who were summoned to contribute to the 
elaboration of the project of a new university in Berlin, and the contrast 
‘authoritarian/liberal’ stays on the surface of something which, in the final analysis, refers 
to different views on human beings, to differing ideas on the development of humanity. 
To state it briefly, Humboldt finds in Schleiermacher’s project his own concept of 
Bildung, a word that means formation, education. But we will see that this term must be 
translated more specifically by ‘self-education’, in the sense that Bildung is essentially 
left to the individual’s initiative, whom through it develops according to his own original, 
inalienable character. Fichte takles, for his part, the question of education from the point 
of view of his philosophical system, the science of knowledge. Consequently, the idea of 
university education based on this philosophy entails that the individual, as he makes 
                                                
2 E. Anrich (ed.), Die Idee der Deutschen Universität (Darmstadt: Hermann Gentner Verlag, 1956). 
3 L. Ferry, J.-P. Person and A. Renaut (eds), Philosophies de l’Université. L’idéalisme allemand et la 
question de l’Université, (Paris : Payot, 1979), p. 17. 
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progress in science (and wisdom), comes to transcend himself as an individual, to go 
beyond his empirical uniqueness. That is what characterizes the two conflicting positions 
that confront themselves in the debate. 
To set out this confrontation of the thought of Fichte with Humboldt and 
Schleiermacher’s own ideas at the occasion of the foundation of the University of Berlin, 
we may proceed in three steps. In the first place, it is proper to provide some details on 
the historical circumstances and the intellectual climate in which this confrontation takes 
place. Afterwards, we will be able to enter the heart of the matter by comparing the 
ultimate idea of the finality of the human being on both sides. The vocation of man in 
society in Fichte and its equivalent in Humboldt will be contrasted here. Finally, the third 
step will allow us to observe in a precise manner – with the help of concrete examples –  
the consequences which at the pedagogical level follow from these differing ideas of the 
vocation of man. 
 
I – Historical and intellectual context of the foundation of the University of Berlin. 
 
 The event of the the foundation in 1810 of the first university establishment in 
Berlin can in itself seem astonishing: at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the city 
of Berlin no doubt hosts specialized institutes and a few academies, among which we 
have to include first and foremost the famous Academy of science, but it does not have 
an actual university.4 The main university of Prussia is in fact to be found in Halle, in the 
dukedom of Magdeburg. But, with the loss of this duchy following the Napoleonic 
invasions, the question of the creation of a university establishment in the capital of 
Prussia, even of a “transfer” of the University of Halle to Berlin, comes up acutely. So, in 
September 1807, while the city is still occupied by the French troops –they will leave the 
following year --, the minister Beyme is entrusted with the task of seeing to the setting up 
of the University of Berlin.5 But, as on the occasion of this transfer they intend to 
reorganize the structure of the institution from top to bottom, Beyme asks the philosopher 
Fichte to submit a plan to that end before him. A few weeks later, the latter will present to 
                                                
4 On this subject, see Die Universität Humboldt.  Gestern-Heute-Morgen, ed. Gerhard Krüger et al. (Berlin: 
Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1960), p. 18. 
5 See “Présentation”, Philosophies de l’Université, p. 10. 
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the ministry of education his Deduced Scheme for an Academy to Be Established in 
Berlin. Having been informed of the content of this plan, Schleiermacher submits in turn 
a project, under the title of Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense, 
text written and published in 1808. Here, we must not be surprised by the allusion to the 
“German” character of the future institution. Schleiermacher writes “occasional thoughts” 
and, in this case, the circumstances that surround the writing of his text are those of a 
defeated Germany. For Schleiermacher, as for the Fichte of the Addresses to the German 
Nation, the establishment of a “national education” and the setting up of institutions of 
higher learning actually have something of a reflex of defence faced with the invader.6 In 
other words, both philosophers call for a spiritual mobilization of the German people to 
counter the humiliation of the defeat.  
 It will be up to Wilhelm von Humboldt, as a deputy minister commissioned by 
Beyme, to make a choice between the project of Fichte and Schleiermacher. We know 
that he will opt for the model of the latter, which corresponds well to his liberal 
allegiances. However, it is advisable here to be more precise as far as the grounds of his 
decision are concerned. It is no doubt as a political man, responsible for “cult and 
education,”7 that Humboldt makes his choice. But his political liberalism is not just a 
veneer and it is not a case of thoughtless or unconsidered support. It possesses, on the 
contrary, a deep-rooted foundation, characteristic of Humboldt, the thinker. The validity 
of his bias towards Schleiermacher’s project does not for that matter stand out with all the 
desirable clarity from the text he produces between 1809 and 1810 on higher education 
and research, which will remain unfinished: On the Inner and Outer Organization of the 
Higher Scientific Institutions in Berlin. This is why I will take the liberty to consult other 
texts from this author, as I will do for Schleiermacher and Fichte. Be that as it may 
regarding the theoretical arguments that motivated Humboldt’s choice, we are forced to 
conclude that on the level of its tangible results, the adoption of the academic regulations 
proposed by Schleiermacher proved to be sensible. We only need to remember that to this 
day the University of Berlin was able to include within its professorial corpsus close to 
thirty Nobel Prize recipients!  
                                                
6 See Eduard Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Reform des Bildungswesens (Berlin: Reuther & 
Reichard, 1910), p. 199. 
7 See Die Universität Humboldt, Gestern-Heute-Morgen, p. 19. 
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 The intellectual climate in which the project of the University of Berlin originated 
is characterized by an exceptional effervescence. The matter at hand is of course German 
idealism, a philosophical movement standing at the confluence of multiple tendencies and 
influences, among which we have to mention the critical reception of Kant’s work and an 
historical event of far-reaching consequences: the French Revolution. In both cases, for 
that matter, the central problem turns out to be freedom; that is to say, on the one hand, 
freedom as a metaphysical and moral problem, on the other hand, political freedom seen 
from the angle of the concrete conditions for its realization.  
 For the protagonists of the debate here under consideration, these two orders of 
preoccupation are never absent. They are even linked in a certain manner. For instance 
Fichte notes the historical importance of the French Revolution, which he greets with 
enthusiasm, yet he feels at the same time the necessity to set in motion a philosophical 
revolution that not only is in a position to provide a transcendental justification of 
freedom, but also places this freedom at the center of the philosophical system.8 We 
know, for example, that Fichte will describe his science of knowledge as the “first system 
of freedom”. As for Schleiermacher and Humboldt’s attitudes when faced with the 
French Revolution, we must acknowledge that they welcome it in a more mitigated 
fashion. But as Fichte, they feel the need to counterbalance this political event with a 
spiritual mobilization. For instance, we must remember that Humboldt stayed in Paris in 
the summer of 1789. He is therefore an eyewitness to the events of this epoch. Obviously, 
Humboldt is mostly known to posterity as an eminent linguist, notably as the author of 
On language: On the Diversity of Human Language Construction and its Influence on the 
Mental Development of Human Species, the general viewpoint of this thought being 
comparative anthropology. However, what we may be less acquainted with from 
Wilhelm von Humboldt is his posthumous work on the “limits of the State”, which we 
will look into in the next section and which will be of interest for the idea of Bildung that 
is developed therein. For the time being, it should be sufficient to say that Humboldt 
                                                
8 On the close connection that exists in Fichte’s mind between political freedom and the science of 
knowledge, we can refer to Alexis Philonenko, Théorie et Praxis dans la pensée morale et politique de 
Kant et de Fichte en 1793 (Paris: Vrin, 1968), p. 78 sq.  Also see Ives Radrizzani, “Préface” to J. G. Fichte, 
Lettres et témoignages sur la Révolution française (Paris, Vrin, 2002), p 10, 15. 
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adopts a liberal position, halfway between the “egalitarian pathos”9 urged by the 
Revolution and the despotism that all too often was the hallmark of the Prussian State. As 
for Friedrich Schleiermacher, he is mostly known nowadays to have grasped the 
universal character of hermeneutics or else as the author of On Religion: Speeches to its 
Cultural Despisers. Nevertheless, it must not make us forget the altogether central place 
of ethics in his thought.10 In connection with that, I will stress only one point: we find in 
Schleiermacher a criticism of the “legal”11 point of view of Kantian morality. Actually, 
this point takes on a particular importance for our subsequent developments. If freedom 
in Kant’s writings is defined as autonomy, is it necessary, asks Schleiermacher, that the 
moral law in question be the same for all? From a legal point of view, no doubt that it is 
only normal that it be so. However, from a moral point of view, can we also say that 
individuals, being equal in the eyes of the law of practical reason, are so to speak, 
replaceable? We discover here a marked insistence on the uniqueness of the moral 
subject and of his mission on earth, which is not unfamiliar to, as we will see, the idea of 
individual Bildung proposed by Humboldt. 
 In order to better grasp the topic of our discussion, we can compare the three 
authors from the point of view of their concept of freedom, but this time, within the limits 
of the higher education institution. In other words, a first clarification as far as the 
attitude of each of these thinkers regarding “academic freedom” is concerned can here 
turn out to be useful. This is obviously a well-known theme at the time, and it does not 
stem as such from the discussion that surrounded the foundation of the University of 
Berlin. But if we pursue in greater detail the different angles of this academic freedom, as 
we find them listed, for example, in the inaugural address delivered by Fichte at the 
                                                
9 See Robert Haerdter, his postscript to Wilhelm von Humboldt, Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Grenzen der 
Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1967), p. 218 (cited below Versuch); trans. J. W. 
Burrow, The Limits of State Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1969. 
10 On the articulation of hermeneutics, dialectics and ethics, see Christian Berner, La philosophie de 
Schleiermacher (Paris: Cerf, 1995), p. 39-41.  Robert B. Louden, “Introduction” to Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, Lectures on Philosophical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. VII. 
11 Schleiermacher, Monologen (1800) (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1978), p. 27, see also p. XVIII; from the same 
author Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/06) (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1981), p. 4, 47. 
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University of Berlin in 1811, we will be better able to identify the different points of view 
that are accepted unanimously and those that are at the origin of the dispute.12 
 Fichte tackles the question of academic freedom under two main angles: 1- the 
independence of the institution from the outside world; 2 - the freedom that must prevail 
within the institution. The first aspect of this academic freedom receives the assent of all 
three protagonists: the university must enjoy a complete independence and a perfect 
autonomy from the state and from civil society. Consequently, even if the financing of 
higher learning institutions comes from the government, the latter must not hold the right 
to approve the activities that take place there, at least in principle. We know that in actual 
fact, Humboldt will be forced by circumstances to adopt a position of compromise 
regarding the hiring of professoers.13 The second aspect is itself subdivided into two 
elements: a) the freedom to determine the content of his teaching which must be enjoyed 
by each professor and b) the academic freedom which the students benefit from as 
members of the institution. Here again, the first of these two elements do not pose a 
problem. All three acknowledge that in addition to the freedom to think and to write, the 
university teacher must have the opportunity to determine the content of his classes, in 
accordance with his research interests. However, the disagreement is tangible when it 
comes to the question of the student’s way of life within the institution. As we will have 
the opportunity to observe, Fichte has a concept of the freedom of the student that differs 
from those of Schleiermacher and Humboldt. The disagreement, which we will expound 
the diverse facets of in the third part of this presentation, concerns the student’s concrete 
manners as much as the questions relating to the regulations of studies and to the 
modalities of learning. In the last case, we will see major differences arise with regard to 
                                                
12 In 1811, Fichte actually becomes the first rector elected by the senate. The title of his speech is the 
following: “Über die einzig mögliche Störung der akademischen Freiheit” (“Concerning the Only Possible 
Disturbance of Academic Freedom”), in J. G. Fichte, Sämmtliche Werke, book VI (Berlin: Veit & Comp., 
1845/46), p. 451-476 (the complete works of Fichte are cited below Werke, followed by the volume and the 
pagination). 
13 On the part played by the state in the process of hiring teachers, see Wilhelm von Humboldt, „Über die 
innere und äussere Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin“ (1809 or 1810), in  
Die Idee der deutschen Universität,  p. 380, 385 (cited below Organisation) ; also see Eduard Spranger’s 
introduction to the anthology Über das Wesen der Universität (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1919), p. XXII.  On 
Schleiermacher’s position, see Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn (1808), in 
the same, Texte zur Pädagogik, book 1, ed. M. Winkler and J. Brachmann (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 
2000), p. 122 (cited below Gelegentliche Gedanken).  I will occasionally allow myself to modify the 
translations used. 
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the student-teacher relationship. But for the moment, it is proper to draw our attention to 
the theoretical presuppositions that motivate in an underground manner the respective 
positions.  
 
II- The vocation of man according to Fichte and Humboldt. 
 
 As astonishing as it may seem, the outcome of the conflict between the 
“authoritarian” and the “liberal” approach of the University of Berlin was sealed even 
before Fichte and Humboldt entrusted their plan to the ministry. Already, at the 
beginning of the 1790’s, Humboldt had produced a manifesto in praise of liberalism, the 
title of which is in itself very evocative: The Limits of State Action. At the time, the work 
was not published in its entirety, but only a few sections, notably Chapter VI on state and 
education, which appeared in the December 1792 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift. 
Of course, this is a political treatise, but we discover in it the workings, in a way that is 
not irrelevant, of the concept of Bildung. For it essentially corresponds to the idea that 
Humboldt has of man, as an individual in relation to society. This text, published in its 
entirety posthumously, can therefore serve as a basis for the comparison of this concept 
of man with that of the vocation of man in Fichte. To set the stage for the comparison, it 
is not necessary to refer to Fichte’s 1800 work entitled precisely The Vocation of Man. 
This theme is actually tackled by Fichte in Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s 
Vocation that he gave the moment he arrived at the University of Jena in 1794. Only two 
years separate the writing of Humboldt’s text from Fichte’s lectures. But the difference 
between their respective positions is no less important and will come up again at the time 
of the evaluation of the projects for the new university.  
In order to get the measure of the theoretical, even philosophical, gap that widens 
between the concepts of the individual on both sides, it might be helpful to juxtapose two 
passages drawn from each of the texts considered here. In both cases, what is called into 
question is the concept of man in relation to society. Let us begin with this passage from 
Humboldt:  
 9 
 The highest ideal… of the co-existence of human beings, seems to me to 
consist in a union in which each strives to develop himself from his own 
inmost nature, and for his own sake.14 
 
Let us now read this passage from Fichte’s lectures: 
 All of the individuals who belong to the human race differ among 
themselves. There is only one thing in which they are in complete agreement: 
their ultimate goal – perfection... the ultimate and highest goal of society is 
the complete unity and unanimity of all of its members.15 
 
 Clearly, the theme is the same in both cases, but the direction adopted by each 
of the authors is radically opposed. For Humboldt, the finality of communal life is 
entirely centered on the individual, it is directed to his sole benefit. He is called on to 
pursue his development, to see to his own education (Bildung) as an individual, the latter 
appearing to be the ideal of “communal existence”. On the other hand, the Fichtean 
individual, at least conceived according to the ideal of humanity presented here, is invited 
to develop himself and in this way to make himself similar to all other human beings. 
Thus, on the one hand, we have a very clear affirmation of the individual, conceived as 
irreducible, on the other hand, the individual seems called on to abandon his originality, 
to make himself identical, at least in an asymptotic way, to all other men. It is therefore 
important to examine more closely these two approaches with a view to anticipate the 
consequences they entail as far as university life is concerned. Let us begin by Fichte’s 
thesis as expounded in On the Scholar’s Vocation.  
 To define the place of man in society, Fichte proceeds in two steps. First he 
establishes an ideal of perfection unattainable in itself, after which he introduces the task 
of an infinite perfecting, the latter being likely to summon up here and now the efforts of 
the individual, even if, in the end, it is always the pure and intangible ideal of perfection 
that must be aimed at. However, this ideal of perfection, although it refers to an absolute 
out of reach in concrete terms, nonetheless takes on for Fichte a deciding status, for it 
commands the gradual perfecting to which the individual must oblige, given the limits 
imposed by his finiteness. The idea of perfection for man is stated as follows: “Perfection 
                                                
14 Humboldt, Versuch, p. 25-26; trans. p. 19. 
15 Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, Werke I, p. 310 (quoted hereafter as 
Einige Vorlesungen); trans. D. Breazeale,  Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s Vocation, in J. G. 
Fichte, Early Philosophical Writings (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 159. 
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is determined in only one respect: it is totally self-identical.  If all men could be perfect, if 
they could all achieve their highest and final goal, then they would be totally equal 
[gleich] to each other. They would constitute but one single subject.”16  The individual 
does not have according to this text an intrinsic value, since he expresses a particularity 
that must be surmounted.  In point of fact, all individuals, as rational beings, are endowed 
with a common nature.17 To use the terminology of the System of Ethics (1798), all have 
in themselves a pure I, which every individual must seek to bring his empirical and 
singular I in accordance to, with the help of a long and patient quest for adequation with 
the latter18. If all human beings were able to succeed in absorbing their empirical I into 
their pure I, all would be identical and would merge into a one and only subject. This 
thesis will remain decisive for the Fichte of the Berlin period. 
 If we now move on from the level of pure perfection to that of gradual perfection, 
we see the place and role of the individual in the development of human society take 
shape. Going back to a theme cherished by Kant in his “Idea for a Universal History from 
a Cosmopolitan Point of View” (1784), Fichte maintains that the goal of the human 
species in history lies in the development of all of man’s abilities. Now the presence of 
these abilities in the individual represents a factor of homogenization, at least when these 
abilities are considered from the point of view of pure reason. “Since all talents have their 
foundation entirely within pure reason, they are all equal in themselves; therefore, they 
all ought to be cultivated in the same way – which is what is required by this demand.  
Equal results must always follow from the equal cultivation of equal talents. And thus we 
arrive by another route at the conclusion established in our last lecture: the final aim of all 
society is the complete equality [Gleichheit] of all of its members.”19 But Fichte goes on 
to say that man is not only a rational being, he is also a sensuous being, a finite being on 
                                                
16 Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen, Werke VI, p. 310; trans., p. 159. 
17 Obviously, the issue here is only the question of man is society.  Yet Some Lectures on the Scholar’s 
Vocation does not contain Fichte’s last word on the status of individuality.  In actual fact, if man must rise 
above the egoistic tendency characteristic of the empirical I, an individuality of a superior kind is still 
possible. See Die Anweisung zum seligen Leben (The Way towards the Blessed Life), Werke V, p. 534-536. 
18 Fichte, System der Sittenlehre, Werke IV, p. 169.  On this topic see Edith Düsing, „Das Problem der 
Individualität in Fichtes früher Ethik und Rechtslehre“, Fichte-Studien 3 (1991), p. 29-50; Günter Zöller, 
„The Inividuality of the I in Fichte’s Second Jena Wissenschaftslehre, 1796-1799“, in D. Breazeale and T. 
Rockmore (eds), New Essays in Fichte’s Later Jena Wissenschaftslehre“ (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2002), p. 120-139. 
19 Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen, Werke VI, p. 314-315; trans., p. 163. 
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which the non-I, that is to say nature, exerts a determining influence. In truth, nature 
stands in the way of pure reason since it represents a factor of “diversity”. If there are 
unique individuals in the world, it is essentially because nature introduces this factor of 
differentiation that causes the appearance of the empirical I. In this way nature sees to it 
that this I does not develop equally its abilities, but only a few, according to the 
environment in which nature situated the individual. However, Fichte cannot dispose of 
this factor of diversity that easily. In the perspective of a perfecting of individuals, and 
through it, of the species, he is forced to take it in consideration, and so the concrete 
individual is invited to see to the development precisely of the abilities that nature caused 
the awakening in him: “…nature affects the human mind in a variety of different ways… 
and… never develops the mind’s capacities and aptitudes in the same way twice.”20 
Nature is therefore at the origin of individual particularities and the choice of abilities that 
an individual is likely to want to perfect turns out to be limited, predetermined as it were, 
and so as an individual, he will never be able to aspire to be in himself the worthy 
representative of the entire species. 
 Consequently, the strategy adopted by Fichte to achieve the perfecting of the 
human species will consist in using the particularities imposed on the individual by 
nature, to exhort the latter to develop his natural talent in a unilateral manner: “nature 
develops everyone one-sidedly [einseitig]…”21 Fichte guides the education of each 
according to the talents and abilities that nature gave rise to in the individual. However, 
there is a price to be paid for this targeted development of the individual: he has to 
sacrifice for himself the full blossoming of all of his abilities to concentrate on a few to 
which he devotes himself “exclusively.”22 Within society, there will therefore be a 
distribution of tasks, a division of labor, so that for the greater benefit of the whole, the 
individual keeps certain features of his personality in the dark. Only the species, as Kant 
was already maintaining, can aspire to the full blossoming of the dispositions of 
humanity, whereas the individual can only make up for his own shortcomings by 
receiving from the other individuals the results of the exercise of their particular talents, 
the fruits of their own efforts. With this concession made to the unilateralism of the 
                                                
20 Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen, Werke VI, p. 313, 314; trans., p. 162. 
21 Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen, Werke VI, p. 315; trans., p. 164. 
22 Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen, Werke VI, p. 320. 
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development of the individual talents, Fichte sets himself against Humboldt, whose deep-
down intention, with the concept of Bildung, consists precisely in averting the danger of 
specialization. In the eyes of the latter, it is entirely possible to conceive the development 
of the individual without requiring from him that he shelves complete aspects of his 
personality. 
 The word Bildung has a very broad meaning, as already mentioned, and even in 
Humboldt it is not always used in its specific sense. The term in general means 
formation, education, but it must be understood here as self-education. The word is 
sometimes translated by “culture”, but in the present case it is important to set it aside 
since Fichte borrows from Kant the concept of Kultur to designate, as we have just seen, 
the development of certain privileged abilities in the individual. Now, the term Bildung as 
used by Humboldt is miles away from the Fichtean idea of culture. In Humboldt’s 
excerpt cited above, the whole society was considered according to, even for the benefit 
of the complete development of the individual. The excerpt that follows can help us 
define more closely the constellation in which Bildung displays itself. “The true end of 
Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable dictates of reason, and not 
suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most harmonious 
development [Bildung] of his powers to a complete and consistent whole.  Freedom is the 
first and indispensable condition which the possibility of such a development [Bildung] 
presupposes; but there is besides another essential – intimately connected with freedom, 
it is true – a variety of situations.”23  This text, rich in teachings, shows the main 
difference with the Fichtean idea of culture at the level of the individual. Thus Bildung is 
characterized by a harmonious and proportionate development of the faculties and 
aptitudes, rather than by a selective development of certain talents. For Humboldt, 
Bildung must be both proportionate and brought to its highest point, without dystrophy.  
This is why he uses the word “full” to refer to the individual that develops in this way. 
His development is so to speak multilateral and no longer unilateral, as it is the case for 
the Fichtean individual. In addition, the excerpt refers to the “multiplicity of situations”. 
Now we have seen that, in Fichte, nature causes through the diversity it introduces a 
fragmentation of humanity that can only be surmounted at the cost of an infinite task. In 
                                                
23 Humboldt, Versuch, p. 22; trans., p. 16. 
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Humboldt, on the contrary, the multiplicity of situations to which the individual is 
exposed is not a factor of impoverishment that would incline him to withdraw on his 
particular talents, but rather a positive factor for his personality, as long as he knows how 
to take advantage of it. Of course, the Fichtean individual is also put in contact with 
others. Through his “communication”24 drive, he receives from others the elements of the 
culture he was unable to produce by himself. On the other hand, the Humboldtian 
Bildung allows the individual to realize in an harmonious manner his own formation by 
drawing on his multiple experiences with the outside world, and in particular with the 
social world. The organic metaphor is very present in the passages of Humboldt’s text 
touching on Bildung25 and it conveys very well the spirit in which he conceives the latter. 
The necessary condition to the growth of an organism is obviously the presence in the 
environment of the nutrients necessary to its development. This is the role of the 
multiplicity of different situations mentioned in the excerpt above, which represents a 
real factor of enrichment of a personality conceived as a whole. But if we follow the 
metaphor through, which Humboldt would certainly not be reluctant to, we have to 
acknowledge that the growth itself would be impossible without the presence in the 
organism of an internal principle, without a vital principle of self-formation that 
assimilates and integrates in a coherent whole the materials made available by the 
environment.  
In the excerpt cited, Humboldt finally mentions freedom as an essential condition 
to Bildung. But what is more striking here is not so much that Humboldt lays particular 
stress on this leitmotiv of German idealism, but rather that he reduces its status to that of 
a simple “condition” of Bildung.26 That is to say that the human being is in the first place 
viewed as an individual who develops by himself and for himself. It is hard to conceive 
that Humboldt could be led to sacrifice this individual first preoccupied by the full 
blossoming of his originality. If German idealism got us into the habit of interpreting 
freedom in terms of spontaneity and autonomy, we have to admit that here it seems to 
rest on a vital principle that has no other aim but the harmonious and full development of 
                                                
24 Fichte, Einige Vorlesungen, Werke VI, p. 315. 
25 See for example Humboldt, Versuch, p. 25, 32. 
26 See Robert Haerdter in his postscript to the Versuch, p. 218.  To revisit the themes of multiplicity and 
freedom in Schleiermacher, see Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 150.  
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the individual according to his specific finality.27 To designate the unity of the individual 
that develops himself deliberately and in a methodical way, Humboldt uses the word 
Eigentümlichkeit, which can be translated as “originality” or “significant particularity.”28 
As the etymology of the German word indicates, Eigentümlichkeit refers to a 
“distinguishing” feature. But this particularity is not autistic in a sense where it would 
refer to a singularity cut off from all relation to its environment. The personality 
conquerred at the outcome of the process of  Bildung presents itself as an original figure, 
that is to say as an individual that is able to draw on his inner life as on the original 
sources and that reflects on his environment. Even if not explicitly made by Humboldt, 
the comparison between this type of personality and a work of art as an autonomous 
whole and a microcosm forces itself uopn us.29  It is reminescent of Goethe’s attitude – 
friend of Humboldt –, who wants to create a work of art out of his life. One thing is 
certain however, we are not allowed to assimilate Eigentümlichkeit to Einseitigkeit, the 
humboldtian originality to the Fichtean unilateralism. As if he was in a position to 
anticipate the concept of culture advocated by Fichte in his conferences on the scholar of 
1794, Humboldt was already warning us, in his work of 1792, against the danger of 
atrophy facing the individual that puts all his efforts in the development of only one 
talent, and showed the way to remedy it. “Every human being… can act with only one 
dominant faculty at a time…  It would therefore seem to follow from this, that man is 
inevitably destined to a one-sided cultivation, [Einseitigkeit] since he enfeebles his 
energies by directing them into a multiplicity of objects. But man has it in his power to 
avoid this one-sidedness, by attempting to unite the distinct and generally separately 
exercised faculties of his nature.”30  The individual is therefore not condemned to use in 
an isolated manner only a few of his abilities. On the contrary, all he has to do is to relate 
them to each other to create a new, incomparable product.  
                                                
27 It is proper however to add that the act of seeing to one’s own Bildung in turn modifies humanity’s 
character taken globally. Thus Humboldt confides to Forster: „Mir heisst in das Grosse und Ganze wirken: 
auf den Charakter der Menschheit wirken, und darauf wirkt jeder, so bald er auf sich und bloss auf sich 
wirkt“. Cited in Eduard Spranger, Wilhelm von Humboldt und die Reform des Bildungswesens, p. 53. 
28Humboldt, Versuch, p. 24, 43.  See the same theme in  Schleiermacher, Monologen, p. 31 ; Brouillon zur 
Ethik (1805/06), p. 13, 16. 
29 See Louis Dumont, L’idéologie allemande, p. 128. 
30  Humboldt, Versuch,  p. 22; trans. (modified), p. 16.  For a similar passage in Schleiermacher, see his 
Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/06), p. 41.  For a critique of one-sidedness, see also his Gelegentliche Gedanken, 
p. 113. 
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 If Humboldt keeps at a distance from a humanity entirely fragmented into 
overspecialized individuals, he also warns us against the reverse danger of a humanity 
that is present in all individuals, but reduced to the lowest common denominator. In other 
words, he is anxious not to fall out of the frying pan into the fire: if he warns us against 
unilateralism and overspecialisation, he is also preoccupied with telling us to beware of 
the standardization of a humanity composed of similar, but weakened individuals. And in 
that treatise of political theory, it is first and foremost the state that is accused of 
producing the homogenization of individuals, by simply identifying them to their citizen 
or subject’s status, and reducing them to it. “Like [gleichförmige] causes produce like 
effects; and hence, in proportion as state interference increases, the agents to which it is 
applied come to resemble each other, as do all the results of their activity.”31  The liberal 
plea is here directed against state interventionism in general, but further in the work, 
Humboldt is able to develop his criticism and turn his attention to specific themes. In this 
way, Chapter VI of the book is devoted to the educational system and presents a 
unequivocal stand: Humboldt distinctly prefers private schooling to a public educational 
system, insofar as everything that emanates from the government invariably tends to 
serve the ends of the state, in this case to impose a standardized education which, by 
hindering the development of original personalities, keeps the people in indifference and 
indolence.32 I already mentioned that in the document in which he outlined the 
organization of the University of Berlin, Humboldt concedes a certain intrusion of the 
state in the process of appointment of teachers, but in no way does that mean that he 
abandons his concept of Bildung and the originality connected with it, in the way in 
which he foresees the educational relationship.  
 The work from Humboldt which we just referred to, The Limits of State 
Action, is obviously a work of youth and it does not convey exactly Humboldt’s position 
at the time he writes his document On the Inner and Outer Organization of the Higher 
Scientific Institutions in Berlin. He actually broadened his point of view in the meantime, 
which, at the beginning, aimed at putting the emphasis exclusively on individual 
freedoms. In this way, the study of peoples becomes little by little for him an object of 
                                                
31 Humboldt, Versuch, p. 31; trans., p. 24. 
32 Humboldt, Versuch, p. 72. 
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study. In the years 1805-1806, he formulates the ambitious project of a comparative 
anthropology that aims to show that, as for individuals, the different nations have their 
characteristic genius with the help of which they acquire a distinctive character. This 
means that all nations, by virtue of their distinctive traits, have an intrinsic value that is 
irreducible to that of any other culture there is. This intention of course follows the thesis 
of historicism according to which each epoch of human history, each civilization has in 
itself its center of gravity and must be appreciated according its particular characteristics. 
This is in contrast of course to the linear vision of an Aufklärung that define history as a 
constant progress under de aegis of reason. Besides, the great instigator of historicism in 
Germany, Herder, is he not himself the inventor of the Bildung? At least, this is what is 
suggested by the title of his 1774 work Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur 
Bildung der Menschheit.33 
 If each nation, each individual possesses value in itself, it is because each 
constitutes a sui generis element inside the creation. Such in fact is the general 
framework in which belongs Humboldt’s “liberalism”. The divine creation must not be 
read uniquely according to the plan of an eschatological history, entirely oriented towards 
a final result. On the contrary, what is also important is to show to advantage the infinite 
wealth of human history, which presents a multiplicity of different facets. This profusion 
of distinct figures, irreducible to a common denominator, actually shows the greatness of 
the divine project.  
 It would probably be easy to show that in the works that precede his 
Occasional Thoughts, Schleiermacher carried on a reflexion to the themes that presents a 
lot of resemblance with those expounded in Humboldt. In actual fact, we find there is a 
marked concern for Bildung, as well as for the “originality” that characterizes it. He 
stresses the importance for the individual to draw from the community in order to pursue 
his process of development while being careful not to let himself be swallowed up by this 
community. Therefore, it is important that each individual circumscribe his “sphere”. 
Schleiermacher’s texts, published in 1800, that is at the time when he was very close to 
the romantic movement, have an abundance of allusions directed to this end. The same is 
                                                
33 On this subject, see Louis Dumont, L’idéologie allemande,  p. 110-111. Theodore Ziolkowski, Clio:  The 
Romantic Muse. Historicizing the Faculties in Germany (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
2004), p. 180-181. 
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true for the remainder of the Brouillon zur Ethik dating from 1806-1807 in which Hans-
Joachim Birkner sees an “ethics of individuality”34 being outlined. But instead of looking 
into these texts, let us illustrate their content in concrete terms by underlining some 
elements of the educational theory that follow from them.  
 
III – The student life and the organization of studies in the new university. 
 
 Before tackling their differences at the level of the educational approach for 
university teaching, it is important to stress the fact that the three protagonists involved in 
the debate share a certain number of theoretical premises. I have already mentioned the 
importance of academic freedom, but I should also stress the predominant place, in 
Humboldt and Schleiermacher as in Fichte, of the active participation of the student to 
the educational process. If the self-education, in the specific meaning that we have 
identified for the Bildung, belongs in its own right to the model put forward by Humboldt 
and Schleiermacher, it does not mean that the Fichtean student will behave in a passive 
way for it. The keynote of Fichte’s whole philosophy is the primacy of the practical. Thus 
in the field of pedagogy, Fichte could only be in agreement with the theses of the great 
theoretician Pestalozzi for whom education requires in an essential manner the active and 
constant participation on the part of the student. Therefore, in all cases, it is important to 
break the ties with an academic institution that only relies on rote learning and 
mechanical educational methods. It is a question of freeing the institutions of higher 
education from all the dogmatism and the whiff of scholasticism that can still afflict 
them. On that score, some universities already in place, like Göttingen and Halle, began 
to show the way. It is therefore a question of continuing those efforts by seizing the 
occasion that is offered to set up a brand new university in Berlin.  
 In order to properly differentiate Fichte’s position from that of his liberal 
opponents, we can use an example that, even if at first sight it may seem to be only an 
insignificant detail, nonetheless conceals, as we will see, a far-reaching significance. The 
example refers to student life and concerns one of its facets among many others: the dress 
code. For instance, Fichte proposes that the “regular” students of the university wear a 
                                                
34 See his introduction to Schleiermacher, Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/06), p. VII. 
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“uniform”. It does not matter that by this means he is anxious to distinguish these 
students from the novices and the honorary members. It is the fact itself, namely that he 
wants to impose the wearing of the uniform, that is in itself significant. Because in his 
Occasional Thoughts, Schleiermacher advocates exactly the opposite: the students are 
expressly invited to adopt the clothing of their choice, without hesitating, if need be, to 
fall into extravagance. What can we say about Schleiermacher’s rather libertarian attitude 
faced with Fichte’s position? Here the contrast is striking, but this simple disciplinary 
measure takes on a greater significance when we realize that it touches on one of the 
central issues of the subject of Bildung. We must remember that the concept of Bildung 
rejects any measure designed to fuse the individuals into a homogeneous mass. If the 
German language refers to the clothing here in question by the substantive Uniform, as in 
English, German has at its disposal, to refer this time to the English adjective ‘uniform’, 
its own construction, but in all respects equivalent: ein-förmig.  Consequently, if Fichte 
requires that the uniform be worn in the institution of higher education, does it mean in 
the same way that the education of the student would also be likely to adopt only one 
form, as opposed to the cult of “originality” advocated by the supporters of Bildung? In 
other words, is education aimed at bringing up the student to a unique system of 
knowledge accepted as a norm or else is it seeking to promote the development of the 
individual through knowledge? These are in fact the general terms of the debate that 
define the opposition here in question.  
 The section of Schleiermacher’s text in which the latter handles the question 
of the dress code is entitled “On the Usages and Customs at the University and on 
Surveillance.”35 To be sure, this section does not deal with morality as such, for even 
within the walls of the university, Schleiermacher does not tolerate any derogation from 
moral duties or bending of the laws of civil society. But by adopting a liberal attitude, 
comprehensive with respect to the concrete way of life of students, he presupposes that 
there is a very clear dividing line between the manners commonly accepted in society and 
the ‘alternative’ way of life that can adopt young people on account of their special 
student status. In fact, it is because this phase in the life of the young people, i.e. their 
studies, is a transitional stage, that in which between when the child is enjoined to obey 
                                                
35 Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 148-159. 
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without batting an eyelid, and the adoption, in adulthood, of a profession or social 
position, which are governed by a code of conduct that is not always free of conformism. 
Between these two stages where the room to manoeuvre of the individual is fairly thin, 
there are the university studies and their corresponding way of life. For Schleiermacher, 
the task of the students, that consists in forming themselves (bilden) through science, is in 
keeping with this privileged stage, during which it is possible to stand back from the 
social conventions, with a view to examine their value and eventually reject it to invent 
new ways of life. The period of studies is this very special stage where the individual can 
indulge in all imaginable experiments in order to adopt in the end the kind of life that 
bests suits his unique personality. That is why, besides extravagances in clothing, 
Schleiermacher also urges the reader to open-mindedness when faced with the linguistic 
features introduced by the students, faced with their overeating and also sometimes even 
their extreme frugality, faced with them spending money extravagantly as much as their 
Spartan way of life. For they are all trials and errors that allow young persons to better 
know themselves and become conscious of their uniqueness, which is likely to shelter 
them form the leveling brought about by the conventions of a civil society that they will 
be forced to reintegrate at the end of their studies. Here is how Schleiermacher justifies 
this dimension of academic freedom: “When this freedom is formed [sich bidet] by itself 
in such a way that it becomes part of the innermost spirit of the university; when the 
multiplicity [Mannigfaltigkeit] and the originality [Eigentümlichkeit] of the lifestyles 
become all the more prominent that in the order strands of society uniformity 
[Gleichförmigkeit] and lack of character [Charakterlosigkeit] come to the fore: then this 
freedom seems to be a beneficial counterweight to which we should not oppose unless we 
have the best reasons to do so.”36  We can clearly see here the stakes associated with the 
freedom conceded to students. That which at the beginning can seem to be only an 
intolerable turmoil turns out to be, when all is said and done, beneficial at the highest 
degree for the future citizen and for the progress of society in general.  
 There is nevertheless a point that is separately dealt with by Schleiermacher 
and which he describes in a prudent and detailed manner. It is the question of the many 
cases of duels that under pretexts that on the surface may seem frivolous, take place 
                                                
36 Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 153-154. 
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between students. The question is delicate, but Schleiermacher does not depart from his 
general line of conduct and maintains that the duel is an institution that must be tolerated. 
For, to him, what is at stake in every duel is the attack to the honour of the individual. 
Now, the sense of honour is in his eyes essential for the development of the person and 
the duel probably provides that person with the only means to defend that honour, at the 
peril of his life. Such is definitely the deep-rooted motivation of Schleiermacher’s 
tolerant attitude, who pretends moreover that the duel leads to a tragic outcome only in 
some very rare cases. 
 Fichte’s reply to this unacceptable concession made by Schleiermacher will be 
more than categorical. He actually devotes all his energy to condemning the duel, first for 
obvious moral reasons, but also for reasons touching on the very idea of what must be the 
honour of the student. If, as Schleiermacher intends it, the student enjoys momentarily a 
privileged status that places him on the fringe of society, he must still prove equal to the 
privilege that was bestowed on him, by devoting himself body and soul to the task of 
learning. And it is precisely in this that lies his honour. He must devote his time and 
efforts to this task, and to nothing else. He is, as we say nowadays, a “learner” and he 
must show that he is worthy of this status that exempts him from seeing to his material 
subsistence. Now, because knowledge results in a greater lucidity with regard to moral 
duty, a serious student would never challenge someone to a duel. Students and teachers 
must devote themselves exclusively to the task of knowledge, and this is why, in Fichte, 
the former as well as the latter wear the uniform. This external distinction in fact shows 
the specific character of their common mission.37 However, a question crops up right 
away: does the wearing of an identical uniform by both groups mean that teachers and 
students are on an equal footing? Far from it. 
 Two remarks can here take the place of an answer to that question. The first 
concerns the relationship of students between themselves. If regular students wear the 
                                                
37 The wearing of the uniform however does not promote the student to the rank of a social position 
(Stand).  On the contrary, by refusing the duel, Fichte wants to neutralize the influence of a particular stand, 
the nobility, which introduces its own practices in the university. The duel is the best example of it. I am 
referring here to Jean-François Goubet’s manuscript, “Über die Akademische Freiheit.  Analyse eines 
sittlichen, rechtlichen und philosophisch-grundlegenden Begriffs in Bezug auf Fichtes Antrittsrede zum 
Rektoreamt im Jahre 1811“.  For a criticism of the student’s disorderly lifestyle, see Fichte,  Fünf 
Vorlesungen über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten, Werke XI, p. 145-208. 
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uniform, it is because they are entrusted with a common mission. Of course, the fact that 
they are encouraged in accordance with Fichte’s plan to communicate between 
themselves contributes to increase the acquisition of knowledge. But the latter 
consequently becomes a common good, with the result that by no means do we aim in 
this way at the development of the individual as a unique personality. On this topic, 
Fichte speaks rather of a “fusion of the individuals in an organic whole devoted to 
learning.”38  If the individual is seen as disappearing into the whole, assimilated to it, it is 
that he is only considered in his capacity as a learner (lernende Individuen). The detail is 
important as Schleiermacher prefers for his part to describe the university not as a place 
where one learns (Lernen) but where one develops knowledge (Erkennen) in itself.39 As 
we will see, the latter will invite the student to do science, whereas Fichte, on the whole, 
simply urges him to accede to science.  
 This is reflected in the way Fichte understands the teacher-student 
relationship. And this is the object of my second remark. Of course, Fichte strongly 
recommends the continuous communication between teacher and students, as he was 
encouraging communication between students. He even insists for a true “Socratic 
dialogue” to take place between the professor and the student.40 But then, we must 
remember that – and Fichte’s text is clear on that subject –  in a Socratic dialogue the 
teacher acts like as a midwife. He knows in advance the answer, the only possible one, 
and he brings his interlocutor, with the help of sustained exchange, to discover it in 
himself. This way, it goes without saying, the student “forms” himself, but he forms 
himself in a direction prescribed in advance, the same for all. Thus, for example, when in 
his Deduced Scheme Fichte discusses the teaching of philosophy, which takes the form of 
a dialogue with the student, he admits that it is out of the question for the philosophy 
teacher to impart to the student in a peremptory manner his own philosophical system. 
Actually, Fichte is quite convinced that, his science of knowledge being the one and only 
true philosophical system, a student that with his help systematically follows his own 
                                                
38 Fichte, Deducirter Plan einer zu Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt , Werke VIII, p 104. 
39 Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 149. 
40 Fichte, Deducirter Plan, Werke VIII, p 104-105. See from the same author, Ideen für die innere 
Organisation der Universität Erlangen (1805/06), Werke XI, p. 280-281.  For that matter, Hegel shares 
Fichte’s opinion on that point. See Hegel, review of the Nachgelassene Schriften und Briefwechsel of 
Solger (1828), in Werke 11 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 270. 
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thought process, can only arrive at this philosophy and reconstruct the system in full. 
According to this viewpoint, the teaching relationship is in keeping with a process where 
the goal is not to provide the student with the occasion to develop according to his own 
genius, but to help him reach the pinnacle of knowledge. 
 As we could have expected, the situation is very different among the 
supporters of a liberal education. And this is equally true in relation to the status and the 
role of the student as it is of his relationship with the teacher. In this way, according to 
the model expounded by Schleiermacher, the student is certainly not only a raw material 
to which we would impose a specific form; he is on the contrary an active element of the 
institution, a fully qualified member. We can even go as far as saying that the university 
is there for him, in the sense that its task is to promote the expression of his “personnal 
originality.” It must contribute to the growth of that which is in a latent state in himself: 
an “original intellectual life” (eigentümlich). This is because the student is driven deep 
down by a “principle of development” (bildendes Prinzip) that needs to manifest itself.41 
But for that, he must feed his personality and it is in the institution of higher education 
that he draws the material necessary to his blossoming. As Louis Dumont writes with 
regard to the Humboldtian approach to university, “Wissenschaft is not in the service of 
the state, it provides the individual with the materials out of which he achieves his 
Bildung.”42 It obviously goes without saying that for these authors the university must be 
useful to the state, so it comprises components relating to vocational training. But in the 
university of liberal approach, it is science that must be at the heart of the institution, and 
this “objective science” must necessarily be connected to the “subjective Bildung.”43 The 
student is therefore not bound by any constraint as far as the choice of courses and 
attendance are concerned. It is he who creates his program according to his intellectual 
development’s own requirements.  
 For instance the student is in search of something other than simple elements 
of doctrine. I just mentioned that for Schleiermacher the university is not so much the 
place where we learn, as it is the one where we are involved in the production of 
knowledge. From the teacher’s point of view, the institution is also defined as a place 
                                                
41 Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 123, 157. 
42 Louis Dumont, L’idéologie allemande, p. 171. 
43 Humboldt, Organisation, p. 377. 
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where research and teaching become closely linked (Einheit von Forschung und Lehre). 
This means that what is the subject of teaching is the fruit of the teacher’s current 
research. But the university student is expressly invited to actively engage in research 
development. And this, not only to perform subordinate tasks, but in full right. The 
following excerpt, taken from the project written by Humboldt, is very eloquent in this 
respect. “The relation between teacher and student become… totally different from what 
it was [at the Gymnasium. C. P.].  The teacher is not there for them, they are all there for 
science; his task is dependent upon their presence and, without it, it would not be fulfilled 
as efficiently.  If they did not gather spontaneously around him, he would have to search 
for them in order to come closer to his goals through the combination of his acquired 
strengths, which are however for this reason likely to be less lively and more unilateral, 
with their weaker but less partial strengths heading enthusiastically in every direction.”44 
This close collaboration between teacher and student finds its paradigmatic expression in 
the seminars, which are a German specialty. Naturally, the seminar is not accessible to 
all, but only to the most advanced students. However, it underlines very well the 
importance attached to the student who, with the help of his own resources, takes part in 
research on an equal footing. According to Schleiermacher, this formula is particularly 
appropriate for the sciences that have a concrete object, because they engage in research 
that constitutes a never-ending quest.45 It is very significant that in his Deduced Scheme, 
Fichte does not mention the formula of the seminar (except when intended exclusively 
for teachers).46 He only touches on the conversatorium. But precisely in that case the 
student is not invited to contribute to the development of science. In his private 
conversation with the teacher, he goes back to the content of the class and the difficulties 
he met with instead. Now, it is at this moment that the teacher, according to Fichte, uses 
his art of midwifery. 
 This brings us, to finish, to the structuring of the various disciplines within the 
university. We must expect from the outset that this structure be very hierarchical in 
                                                
44 Humboldt, Organization, p. 378. 
45 Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 140: “Die Seminarien… schliessen sich an die Disziplinen 
an, welche mehr in das besondere gehen, und sind dasjenige Zusammensein der Lehrer und Schüler, worin 
die letzteren schon als produzierend auftreten und die Lehrer nicht sowohl unmittelbar mitteilen als nur 
diese Produktion leiten, unterstützen und beurteilen.”    
46 We must admit however that Fichte’s plan remained unfinished.    
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Fichte and that philosophy occupies the predominant position. Since the very beginning 
of the project of the science of knowledge, it is in fact clear that for Fichte there is only 
true philosophy and that this philosophy provides the first principles of all the other 
scientific disciplines. This is why this philosophy defined itself directly as the “science of 
sciences in general”. This expression appears in a text whose title shows right from the 
beginning that Fichte intends to mark his distance in relation to everything that up to this 
point was done under the title of “philosophy”: Concerning the Concept of the 
Wissenschaftslehre or of What we Use to Call Philosophy.47 This text dates from the 
spring of 1794, at the moment when Fichte had just accepted a chair in philosophy at the 
university of Jena. But the latter will stand by this opinion of his own system until the end 
of his carreer.48 It is not surprising consequently that the student be considered as the one 
who must, by himself and through his own resources rise to that knowledge. Hence the 
emphasis put by Fichte on his status of Lehrling (learner). It is not surprising either that 
the pedagogical model proposed by Fichte has a bit of an ‘authoritarian’ appearance. But 
this is especially valid for the very last Fichte, the author of the 1813 Staatslehre.49 The 
tone is much more restrained in the Deduced Scheme, so that it is probably more accurate 
to characterize the pedagogical program that is developed there, as ‘controlled’, as 
opposed to the liberal model.  
 Schleiermacher shares with Fichte the thesis according to which philosophy 
comes first within the university. However, when we scrutinize things more closely, we 
realize that the hierarchy that follows from it is less strict in Schleiermacher. As a matter 
of fact, the latter revives one of Kant’s last battles: to show that in the traditional 
hierarchy of university faculties (theology, law, medicine and philosophy), it is the 
‘lower’ faculty (philosophy) that must hold the supremacy from a purely scientific point 
of view. Now as the mission of the university of Schleiermacher and of Humboldt 
essentially revolves around Wissenschaft (as opposed to the technical and vocational 
training) it was foreseeable that in this respect Schleiermacher was going to support 
Fichte, and by extension Kant. However, it is to be well noted that this position is not 
                                                
47 Fichte, Über den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre oder der sogenannten Philosophie, Werke I, p. 44. 
48 Fichte,  Die Staatslehre (1813), Werke IV, p. 373.  Fichte describes here the term philosophy as a 
nichtiger Name. 
49 See my « La Doctrine de l’État de 1813 et la question de l’éducation chez Fichte », in J.-C Goddard and 
M. Maesschalck (eds), Fichte. La philosophie de la maturité (1804-1814) (Paris: Vrin, 2003), p. 159-174. 
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really compromising since the primacy of philosophy is maintained in the first place as a 
university faculty. That means that all the disciplines comprised in this faculty are 
affected by it, including of course the empirical sciences. The priority goes quite as much 
to the empirical disciplines as to philosophy in the narrow sense of the term. “The whole 
natural organization of the sciences is exclusively contained in the [faculty of philosophy, 
C.P.]: the pure transcendental philosophy and the natural as well as the historical 
sciences…”50  Philosophy in the narrow sense of the term has no special privilege. But 
here also, there again, Schleiermacher, who feels closer to Schelling than to Fichte, 
hesitates in his text to give his opinion on the respective worth of philosophical systems.51 
He had moreover announced in his previous works that there is no such thing as a unique 
philosophy. Any philosophy must according to him have a national colour, and so we 
count as many philosophies as there were philosophical peoples in the past. Moreover, 
despite the continuity made possible by tradition, he maintains that strictly speaking 
philosophical terminology cannot be translated. We must therefore conclude that in his 
project philosophy has first and foremost an encyclopaedic role.52 
 Humboldt’s attitude is just as inclusive in relation to the hierarchy of 
knowledge within the university. He even prefers to mention four fundamental 
disciplines, with no order of priority. This way, he keeps at a distance from the 
philosopher’s mania of wanting to ‘deduce’ everything, including the program of studies 
at the university, a habit that he will criticize by name.53 Now we know that the project 
submitted by Fichte was entitled Deduced Scheme. The allusion is here very clear and 
translates Humboldt’s mistrust faced with the philosopher’s claims. Besides, if to history, 
philology and mathematics Humboldt added philosophy according to the strictest 
definition of the term, it is in order not to go against Schleiermacher’s proposal.  But we 
should note that at the beginning he thought about including as the fourth discipline 
anthropology, his favourite field of research. For what is important for the university is 
not the hierarchy of knowledge but rather the multiplicity and wealth of the sciences to 
which the individual can choose to devote himself with a view to his own development. 
                                                
50 Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 133, 134. 
51 Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 127. 
52Schleiermacher, Gelegentliche Gedanken, p. 117-118 ; see also Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/06), p. 25, 91.  
53Humboldt, Organisation, p. 382.  
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*  *  * 
 Let us briefly review the two approaches to university that were compared 
here and examine their topicality, or even their obsolete character, without it being 
prejudicial for it to the intrinsic value and the respective worth of both positions. In other 
words, the question consists in knowing if, independently of the appeal they may hold for 
us, those two models of university organisation are still practicable today.  
 The distinctive trait of the plan proposed by Fichte lies in the pre-eminence of 
philosophy, which fulfills a predominant role. It is dominant in this model insofar as, as 
we have seen, it provides the different sciences with their first principle. Philosophy sees 
itself here as being invested with a foundational role. But, already at the time when he 
writes his project, Fichte has no illusions as for the reception that will be given by the 
scientists to this interference of philosophy.54 He knows that he must expect to come up 
against a profound distrust and a resolute scepticism. Fichte’s position reproduces in 
reality a classical gesture in philosophy, which was handed down to posterity after him. 
Thus, for example, at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century 
the neo-Kantians brought up again this pretension to found all scientific discourses, but 
with a mixed success. By what right in fact does philosophy allows itself to intervene in 
scientific practices that develop themselves very well by following their inner logic and 
their own procedures? That is obviously the question that Richard Rorty asks in his work 
Philosophy and the mirror of nature.55 He questions there as a matter of fact the historical 
figure of a neo-Kantian fairly unrecognized, Eduard Zeller, but he tries through that to 
reveal the last whiff of the domineering attitude of philosophy that we find in the first 
phases of this now plural movement which is analytic philosophy. We have seen that 
Fichte’s science of knowledge also tries to be, through some of its aspects, a theory of 
knowledge, a philosophy of all the sciences. But it does not matter here that the 
foundation of the scientific disciplines refers to a transcendental philosophy fully 
assumed as in Fichte, or to a simple epistemology as is often the case for neo-Kantians. 
                                                
54 Fichte, Deducirter Plan, Werke VIII, p. 125. 
55 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
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The fact is that it now appears impossible to assign to philosophy a directing role within 
the contemporary university.  
 If we now turn to the liberal model, we realize that the structure of the 
institution and the program of study are less restricting there. But what may seem to be a 
program leading to dilettantism and to a lack of concern is really supported by a deep-
rooted conviction both in Humboldt and in Schleiermacher: the process of Bildung must 
in the end lead to a better man, in the sense that the practice of science is at the same time 
a moral education.56 This concept, inherited from antiquity, has fairly lost its plausibility 
nowadays, we must admit. If modern science follows an internal logic, it is hard to see 
how the development of a specific scientific set of problems could take on 
simultaneously the role of a moral education. We are in an era of specialization, which 
proves to be a must for the success of scientific research, and so the individual 
preoccupied with his own Bildung, this personality that presents itself to us as a 
microcosm in constant expansion, can hardly find its place in our university institutions. 
Of course, this ideal of a complete human being, well-balanced and cultivated survives 
nowadays, in the university programs dedicated to the humanities for example. We find 
there obviously some similarities with the neo-humanist project that is at the origin of the 
ideal of Bildung. These programs nevertheless remain the exception in those immense 
enterprises that our universities have become.  
 I intentionally use here the word “enterprises” to characterize the 
contemporary university. In fact, I borrow this word form Max Weber who in 1917, in his 
lecture on “Science as a vocation”, uses it to depict modern university. It is because the 
institutions of higher education have become gigantic organisations, endowed with 
considerable means. And this is precisely where the problem arises: scientific research 
requires more and more significant means, and it has the consequence of increasing the 
dependency of the university on the outside world: “We can clearly observe here at home 
that the newest trend in large domains of scientific activity at the university level tend 
towards the American model.  The huge research centres in the field of medicine and of 
the natural sciences are enterprises of state capitalism.  They cannot be managed without 
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the input of important resources.”57 This excerpt here raises a question that was quickly 
resolved at the beginning of this presentation on the foundation of the University of 
Berlin: the independence of the university towards the government and the economic 
system. The assertion of the autonomy of the institution was really the necessary 
presupposition for the debate between ‘liberalism’ and ‘authoritarianism’ to take place. It 
was an original premise that had to be considered established. However, nowadays, it is 
less and less. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Weber mentions the 
government’s appropriation of the institution on account of the magnitude of the 
investments granted there, but he also sees the German university splitting up, around 
which revolve, with a relative independence, research institutes and specialized schools 
ready to meet the demands of the milieu, notably of the economic system. And the trend 
became more pronounced, so that the main problem that arises nowadays has to do with 
the enormous pressure exerted on the university by the industrial world and the 
government apparatus. We see the economic system determine in an ever more precise 
way the research priorities within the institution.58 Also, the government, acting as a 
subsidizing organism, has progressively tended to match its research subsidies not only to 
an obligation of results, but also, because it feels ‘indebted’ to the population, to a 
commitment from the recipient to produce a research useful to the milieu, and to do so in 
a tangible way.  
 In these conditions, it is assuredly illusory to defend the Fichtean model of a 
university organized in a hierarchical way. The autonomy of the disciplines, the 
specialization of research and the fragmentation of the institution into multiple institutes 
and centres of research linked to the needs of civil society clearly makes it inconceivable. 
As for the self-education within the institution, it represents without a doubt an 
interesting model, but how untimely given the current state of affairs. And yet, Humboldt 
firmly believed that in the modern age, progress is no longer engendered by the 
community but only by the individual. 
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